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This paper analyses the poor alignment of the aging statutory framework and modern understandings 
of medical best practice in the context of abortion services.  With a particular focus on medical 
abortion, it assesses the significant challenges that the gulf between the two poses for clinicians, 
service providers, regulators and the courts.  Law is said to be at its most effective where there is a 
shared regulatory community that accepts and endorses the values that underpin it.  It is suggested 
that the example of abortion law provides a marked example of what happens when legal norms once 
justified by broadly shared moral understandings, concerns for patient safety and requirements of 
best practice are now either unsupported by or, indeed, sit in opposition to such concerns.   
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British abortion law: speaking from the past to govern the future 
Sally Sheldon  
 ‘Written norms have two central features which make them particularly problematic regulatory 
instruments: their temporal aspect - they speak from the past or present but purport to govern the 
future - and their linguistic aspect: they are linguistic structures which require interpretation. How they 
will 'work' depends on the interpretation they receive.’1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
When the abortion pill, mifepristone then commonly known as RU486, was first licensed for use in the 
late 1980s, it was heralded as the ‘pill that changes everything’,2 with predictions that it could ‘end 
the abortion wars’.3  The grounds for excitement were clear.  A method permitting early abortions to 
be carried out safely and effectively using pills might transform abortion into a procedure which 
required only the most minimal of skills and facilities to administer, raising possibilities for abortions 
to take place with little supervision in a wider variety of healthcare settings and, perhaps, even in the 
woman’s own home.  This, it was predicted to the delight of some commentators and the horror of 
others, might lead to a profound shift both in political debates regarding abortion and in the 
                                                          
 
1 J. Black (2002) ‘Regulatory Conversations’ 29(1) JLS  163, 172 
 
2 Time Magazine, cover, June 14 1993. 
 
3 L. Lader, RU486: the Pill that Could End the Abortion Wars and Why American Women Don’t Have it (Reading 
Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1992). 
 
development and enforcement of law.  One US lawyer went as far as to suggest that the ‘seemingly 
intractable’ abortion debate was approaching an ‘unceremonious solution’, as the ‘energy presently 
devoted to influencing political and legal institutions ultimately will subside in the face of [this] new 
technological reality’.4   
With the benefit of twenty-five years of hindsight, of course, this prediction looks hopelessly far-
fetched.  While medical abortion (a term used to describe any termination of pregnancy provoked 
using drugs) has become widely available across much of the world, it is undeniable that significant 
energy remains devoted to fighting the ‘abortion wars’.  Indeed, a series of pitched battles in the USA 
are currently focused precisely on issues relating to access to medical abortion.5  At the time of writing, 
five US states have introduced legislation to require that medical abortion be provided according to 
an outdated protocol that is known to have higher rates of side effects and to be less acceptable to 
women.6  Two require that women must be counselled that it is possible to ‘reverse’ the abortion if 
                                                          
4 L.A. Cole, ‘The End of the Abortion Debate’ (1989) 138 Uni of Penn Law Rev 217. 
 
5 US states enacted 51 new abortion restrictions in the first 6 months of 2015, with medical abortion a major 
focus of this activity: Guttmacher Institute, Laws Affecting Reproductive Health and Rights: State Trends at 
Midyear, 2015 (1 July 2015) http://www.guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/2015/07/01/index.html; 
Guttmacher Institute, State Policies in Brief as of July 1, 2015: Medication Abortion, 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MA.pdf (each last accessed 17 October 2015).  
 
6 While doctors often prescribe ‘off label’ where there is a solid medical evidence base to suggest that this is 
appropriate, these states require physicians to prescribe abortion drugs according to the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) label for mifepristone that was approved in 2000. This ignores the fact that newer regimens 
are known to be more effective at higher gestations, cause fewer side-effects, and require less medication and 
fewer visits to the provider, making them more cost-effective, ibid. 
she changes her mind after taking mifepristone (the first drug used in a medical abortion), despite the 
lack of clinical evidence to support the effectiveness or safety of such a ‘treatment’.7   
In the UK, opposition to medical abortion has been far more muted.  The UK was one of the first 
countries to license mifepristone and, since then, a gradual revolution in abortion care has meant that 
today over half of reported induced abortions are provoked using drugs.8  Used in combination with a 
second drug, misoprostol, mifepristone has been shown to be safe, very effective, highly acceptable 
to women, and requiring little by way of specialist skills or facilities to administer.9  However, while 
                                                          
7 The law in one of the states concerned, Arizona, is currently subject to legal challenge and is not being enforced, 
see n 5 above.  A systematic review of the medical evidence in support of such advice found just one publication, 
a case series of only six women in whom ‘abortion reversal’ had been attempted.  Four of the six women 
continued their pregnancy after the ‘treatment’ (which involves the administration of a large dose of hormones), 
a continuing pregnancy rate compatible with that seen in other studies where a woman changes her mind about 
proceeding with the termination after taking mifepristone and receives no further treatment. See, D. Grossman, 
K. White, L. Harris, M. Reeves, P.D. Blumenthal, B. Winikoff, and D.A. Grimes (2015) ‘Continuing Pregnancy after 
Mifepristone and “Reversal” of First-Trimester Medical Abortion: a Systematic Review’ Contraception, available 
online first at http://www.contraceptionjournal.org/article/S0010-7824(15)00226-7/pdf (last accessed 17 
October 2015).   
 
8 Department of Health, Abortion Statistics, England and Wales: 2014 (June 2015); ISD Scotland, Abortion 
Statistics. Year ending 31 December 2014 (May 2015). See generally, S. Sheldon, Beyond Control: Medical Power 
and Abortion Law (London: Pluto, 1997), chapter 7 on the licensing process.   
 
9 A. Templeton and D.A. Grimes ‘A Request for Abortion’ (2011) 365 The New England Journal of Medicine 2198. 
In the UK, medical abortion typically involves the sequential administration of mifepristone (an antiprogestin, 
which acts to block the progesterone receptors causing the uterine lining to break down and increasing the 
sensitivity of the uterus to prostaglandins) followed by misoprostol (a prostaglandin analogue, which induces 
political opposition to abortion is less vociferous on this side of the Atlantic, it has proved similarly 
intractable, being clearly visible in the retention of clinically unjustified legal restrictions on service 
provision.  Over three decades ago our highest domestic court noted that the development of medical 
abortion ‘invites, and indeed merits, the attention of Parliament.’10 Yet while the technology has 
continued to develop apace since this comment was made, such attention has been lacking, leaving 
relevant laws steeped in the clinical beliefs and the practices of far earlier times.11 Moreover, the 
development of medical abortion techniques offers just one example, albeit a particularly powerful 
one, of the significant changes that have occurred since our abortion laws were passed.  Notably, 
along with other technological advances, this period has also witnessed significant changes in how we 
see the respective ethical rights and responsibilities of doctor and patient, and the moral values that 
should inform clinical practice.   
There is an important, ongoing ethical debate regarding how a woman’s rights to autonomy, equality 
and reproductive health should be balanced against the moral respect due to the developing embryo 
or foetus.12  This paper does not seek to engage directly with it.  Rather, taking seriously the broad 
                                                          
uterine contractions that expel the contents of the womb). See RCOG, The Care of Women Requesting Induced 
Abortion (Evidence-based Clinical Guideline No. 7) (London: RCOG, 2011), for guidance regarding best practice. 
 
10 Lord Wilberforce, RCN v DHSS [1981] 1 All ER 545, 566, commenting on second trimester prostaglandin 
inductions.  See below for detailed discussion of this case. 
 
11 The only changes made to the Abortion Act since its enactment were a small number of amendments in 1990, 
see generally, Sheldon n 8 above, chapter 6.  One of these amendments, s 1(3A) is discussed further below, n 
150 and accompanying text.   
 
12 For an introduction to the voluminous literature, see: J. Finnis, M. Cohen, T. Nagel, T.F. Scanlon The Rights and 
Wrongs of Abortion: A Philosophy & Public Affairs Reader (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974); and 
purposes that are said to inform British abortion legislation, it analyses the poor alignment between 
the aging statutory framework and contemporary clinical understandings of best practice in abortion 
services, assessing the significant challenges that the gulf between the two poses for clinicians, service 
providers and regulators.  Law is said to be at its most effective where there is a shared regulatory 
community that accepts and endorses its terms.13  Abortion law provides a marked example of what 
happens where this does not exist.  Here, legal requirements once justified by broadly shared moral 
understandings, concerns for patient safety and requirements of best practice continue unsupported 
by or, indeed, in opposition to such concerns.  In what follows, I briefly outline the law regulating 
abortion in Britain.  I then consider three such points of significant tension, which are inherent in the 
formal requirements that abortion decisions must be made by two doctors rather than the pregnant 
woman herself; that abortions must be performed by a doctor; and that they must be performed on 
NHS or licensed premises.      
  
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT LAW 
The law governing abortion is the oldest extant statutory framework governing any specific medical 
procedure in the UK,14 with the political sensitivity of abortion having contributed to the reluctance of 
                                                          
M. Tooley, C. Wolf-Devine, P.E. Devine, A. M. Jaggar, Abortion: Three Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009). 
 
13 Black, n 1 above, 178. 
 
14 The entire statutory framework for abortion is contained within the first four of the 270 pages of statutes 
extracted in the chronologically ordered A.E. Morris and M.A. Jones (eds) Blackstone’s Statutes on Medical Law, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 5th ed, 2007).  For an excellent discussion of the historical development of the 
successive governments to contemplate reform.15  ‘Unlawful procurement of miscarriage’ is illegal by 
virtue of a statute passed at the midpoint of the reign of Queen Victoria, the Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861.  This offence may be committed either by a pregnant woman herself or by a third 
party.16 A second criminal offence prohibits the unlawful supply of poison, ‘other noxious thing’, or 
any instrument or thing whatsoever, knowing that these will be used unlawfully to procure a 
miscarriage.17  Finally, the offence of ‘concealment of birth’ offers a means of prosecuting women 
where abortion or infanticide is suspected but cannot be proven.18  These prohibitions are the product 
of a time when, in the words of one leading judge, ‘our society was only on the brink of the beginnings 
                                                          
law, see J. Keown, Abortion, Doctors and the Law: Some Aspects of the Legal Regulation of Abortion in England 
from 1803 to 1982 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
   
15 S Sheldon (2015) ‘The Decriminalisation of Abortion: an Argument for Modernisation, Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies, available online first:  
http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2015/09/28/ojls.gqv026.full?keytype=ref&ijkey=bSmwstASzyuZ3c
J (last accessed 17 October 2015).   
 
16 s 58. The latter may be guilty of an offence whether or not the woman had actually been pregnant.  The 1861 
Act applies to England, Wales and Northern Ireland, with a similarly framed common law offence in Scotland, 
see G.H. Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland (Edinburgh: W. Green & Son, 1967).  
 
17 s 59.  
 
18 s 60. For a compelling critique of this provision, see G. Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1958).  
 
of the modern world’, and ‘in matters sexual [was] almost unimaginably different from ours’.19 The 
available sanctions reflect the punitive moral norms of Victorian Britain, with unlawful procurement 
of miscarriage punishable by life imprisonment (the most onerous sentence for abortion foreseen 
anywhere in Europe),20 a sentence that potentially applies from the moment of implantation, some 
six to twelve days after fertilisation.21  A further, heavily overlapping offence is created by the Infant 
Life Preservation Act (1929), which similarly foresees a potential life sentence where someone kills a 
‘child’ who is ‘capable of being born alive’.22  The Law Commission has recently targeted the 1861 Act 
for reform, noting that it is widely recognised as being outdated.  However the abortion offences are 
excluded from the review.23 
                                                          
19 R (Smeaton) v SS Health and Others [2002] EWHC 610 (Admin), 332, per Munby J, who has since gone on to 
become President of the Family Division of the High Court and a member of the Court of Appeal.  
 
20 For a comparative review of European laws, see K. Nebel and S. Hurka ‘Abortion: Finding the Impossible 
Compromise’, in C. Knill, C. Adam and S. Hurka (eds), On the Road to Permissiveness? Change and Convergence 
of Moral Regulation in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
 
21 On the problems that this creates, see S. Sheldon (2015) ‘The Regulatory Cliff Edge between Contraception 
and Abortion: the Legal and Moral Significance of Implantation’ Journal of Medical Ethics, available online first 
at: http://jme.bmj.com/content/early/2015/06/17/medethics-2015-102712.full.pdf+html?sid=8c443f5a-94e0-
4345-a1a9-91708fb26abe (last accessed 17 October 2015).   
 
22 s 1.   
 
23 Law Commission (2014) Reform of Offences against the Person.  A Scoping Consultation Paper (Consultation 
Paper No 217). 
 
Today, these offences under the 1861 and 1929 Acts are charged very rarely and then typically in the 
context of assaults on pregnant women which result in miscarriage of a wanted pregnancy rather than 
in the context of consensual abortion.24  The legislation nonetheless retains a significant role in 
delineating the boundaries within which lawful abortion services may be offered. 
For many years, the onerous provisions of the 1861 Act coexisted with large numbers of clandestine, 
illegal abortions, resulting in significant maternal mortality and morbidity.25 In 1967, the Abortion Act 
was passed to address the situation of women left to attempt to end their pregnancies either alone 
or in the back streets.  It applies in England, Wales and Scotland, but not Northern Ireland.26  The Act 
                                                          
24 See generally, Sheldon (2015), above n 15.  For a rare example of the prosecution of a woman charged with 
ending her own (very advanced) pregnancy, see R v Catt [2013] EWCA Crim 1187.   Two charges have also 
recently been brought under s.59, with the latter having resulted in a conviction.  However it is too early to say 
whether this can be seen as the beginning of a trend towards a greater prosecution of this offence. See A. Erwin, 
‘Belfast Woman will go on Trial for Helping her Daughter to have a Medical Abortion, Belfast Telegraph (19 June 
2015); Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency, ‘Woman Sentenced to 27 Months for Selling 
Abortion Pills Illegally’ (press release, 26 June 2015).  A conviction under s.59 was overturned on appeal in R v 
Ahmed [2010] EWCA Crim 1949, where the offence was not made out on the facts despite an ‘appalling’ attempt 
to procure a non-consensual abortion.    
 
25 See generally, Keown, n 14 above, Sheldon, n 8 above, Williams n 18 above. 
 
26 Northern Ireland has one of the most restrictive abortion laws in Europe, with women either travelling to 
access abortion services in England, or ending pregnancies illegally using medical abortion drugs sourced online.  
See generally F. Bloomer and K. O’Dowd ‘Restricted Access to Abortion in the Republic of Ireland and Northern 
Ireland: Exploring Abortion Tourism and Barriers to Legal Reform’ (2014) 16(4) Culture, Health & Sexuality: an 
International Journal for Research, Intervention and Care 366. 
 
is said to be underpinned by two broad parliamentary purposes: ‘to broaden the grounds upon which 
abortions may be lawfully obtained’ and ‘to ensure that the abortion is carried out with all proper skill 
and in hygienic conditions’27 or, more succinctly, to provide that ‘socially acceptable abortions should 
be carried out under the safest conditions attainable.’28  It carves out a therapeutic exception to the 
serious criminal offences enacted by the 1861 Act, allowing for terminations deemed appropriate by 
two doctors to be performed under strict medical control.29  Specifically, two doctors must certify in 
good faith that the woman meets one of a range of conditions set out in the Abortion Act, framed broadly 
so as to allow for the exercise of significant clinical discretion; the termination must be performed by a 
doctor; and it must be done on NHS or other approved premises.30  
In what follows, I consider the interpretation and application of statutory text that has not been 
substantially revised for almost five decades, to regulate an area of clinical practice that has evolved 
                                                          
27 RCN, n 10 above, 567, cited approvingly in Greater Glasgow Health Board (Appellant) v Doogan and another 
(Respondents) (Scotland) [2014] UKSC 68 at [27], with Lady Hale suggesting that the 1967 Act also had a further 
purpose: ‘to provide such a service within the NHS, as well as in approved clinics in the private or voluntary 
sectors’. 
 
28 RCN, ibid, 575. 
 
29 Since its amendment in 1990, the Abortion Act also offers a defence to prosecution under the Infant Life 
Preservation Act (1929), see s 5(1). 
 
30 Except in the case of emergencies, where the need for a second opinion and the restrictions on place of 
treatment do not apply, see s 1(4). 
 
very significantly over that same period.31  I discuss in detail each of the three provisions noted above, 
assessing how it works fifty years on in a context of very different clinical realities; and I explore some 
of the ways that those charged with interpreting the law have sought to reconcile it with the 
competing norms of best medical practice.  I conclude that these three provisions now exist in 
significant tension with the broad purposes of providing for ‘socially acceptable abortions’ to be 
‘carried out under the safest conditions attainable.’  Further, while clinicians, service providers and 
regulators have laboured to work around the law’s deficiencies, the widening divergence between the 
aging statutory framework, on the one hand, and contemporary clinical practice and ethical norms, 
on the other, creates unjustified restrictions on the provision of a high quality, modern abortion 
service.  This, I conclude, raises a compelling case for statutory reform. 
TWO REGISTERED MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS MUST BE ‘OF THE OPINION, FORMED IN 
GOOD FAITH…’ 
Other than in an emergency situation, abortion in Britain is lawful only when it is deemed, in the good 
faith opinion of two doctors, to fall within one of the grounds set out in s.1(1) of the Abortion Act.   
 
1. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person shall not be guilty of an offence under the law 
relating to abortion when a pregnancy is terminated by a registered medical practitioner if two registered 
medical practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good faith – 
 
                                                          
31 The small number of changes introduced to the Abortion Act in 1990 left untouched the broad structure of 
the Act and those provisions enforcing medical control of abortion that form the focus of this paper.  For an 
overview of the reforms, see J. Murphy, 'Cosmetics, Eugenics and Ambivalence: the Revision of the Abortion Act 
1967' (1991) JSWFL 375; and Sheldon, n 8 above, chapter 6.  
 
(a) that the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week and that the continuance of the 
pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the 
physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family; or 
 
(b) that the termination is necessary to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental 
health of the pregnant woman; or 
 
(c) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the pregnant woman, 
greater than if the pregnancy were terminated; or 
 
(d) that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or 
mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped. 
 
In Parliament, a powerful justification for the introduction of the Act was that it would bring abortion 
out of the back streets, where it had resulted in serious maternal mortality and morbidity, allowing 
doctors to take control of a woman’s situation.  Doctors were to be accorded broad discretion in 
determining when a termination would be appropriate and, in other cases, to offer the kind of 
persuasion and support that would enable a woman to continue with her pregnancy.32  As David Owen 
told Parliament: 
[i]f we allow abortion to become lawful under certain conditions, a woman will go to her doctor and 
discuss with him the problems which arise ... he may well be able to offer that support which is 
necessary for her to continue to full term and successfully to have a child.33 
                                                          
32 For example, Steel, HC Deb vol 732 col 1076 22 July 1966; HC Deb vol 750 col 1348 13 July 1967; Dunwoody, HC 
Deb vol 732 col 1096 22 July 1966. See generally, Sheldon ibid 24-7; Keown, n 14 above, chapter 5. 
 
33 Owen, HC Deb vol 732, col 1116 22 July 1966. 
The need for a second medical signature was intended as a check on rogue doctors, as well as offering 
protection to the doctor himself.  The Act’s sponsor, David Steel, emphasised that, '[w]e want to stamp 
out the back street abortions, but it is not the intention of the Promoters of the Bill to leave a wide 
open door for abortion on request'.34   
Early Implementation of the Abortion Act 
At the time that the Act was passed, the medical profession, like Parliament, was strongly convinced 
that doctors were best placed to decide whether an abortion was justified.  While there were 
important differences between the major medical bodies regarding the detail of reform, all stood 
firmly behind the view that the decision of whether to end a pregnancy belonged to two doctors,35 
with the pregnant woman entitled merely to ‘state her case’.36  A range of accounts published in the 
years following the Act’s introduction revealed how doctors understood their role as gatekeepers to 
legal abortion.  While some individual doctors, particularly those who worked in the private sector, 
immediately adopted a permissive interpretation of the law,37 others did not.  At one hospital, over a 
six month period, 120 of the 170 requests for terminations made were refused.38   Another study 
                                                          
 
34. Steel, HC Deb vol 732 col 1075 22 July 1966. 
 
35 See Keown, n 14 above, S. McGuinness and M. Thomson, ‘Medicine and Abortion Law Reform: Complicating 
the Professions’ (2015) Med L Rev 177; S.J. MacIntyre, 'The Medical Profession and the 1967 Abortion Act in 
Britain' (1973) 7 Soc Sci Med 121-34. 
 
36 MacIntyre, ibid 131. 
 
37 Keown, n 14 above, chapter 5. 
 
 
38 T.L.T. Lewis ‘The Abortion Act’ (1969) 5638(1) BMJ, 241, 242. Numbers of abortion refusals are not collected 
centrally. 
described how some doctors worked hard to persuade women to continue with their pregnancies, 
with many favouring marriage as the best ‘solution'.  As one doctor in this study explained:  
[t]he majority of girls, those I've known since they were children, I manage to persuade them to get 
married.  Girls from outside town, those I haven't seen previously - they're more difficult to persuade.  
Occasionally, girls do come in demanding termination but most can be talked out of it.39   
Some doctors confirmed that they had deliberately acted to create delay, so that the woman would 
fall outside the legal timeframe for access to abortion.40  Women reported that they had been subject 
to what they perceived as overly intrusive questioning,41 and moralizing, judgmental treatment at the 
hands of their GPs.42  Significantly, in some parts of the country, it was virtually impossible to access 
abortion services within the NHS, as senior doctors refused to provide them within their hospitals.43  
                                                          
 
39 S.J. MacIntyre Single and Pregnant (London: Croom Helm, 1979), 75-6.   
 
40 D. Cossey, Abortion and Conscientious Objection (London: Birth Control Trust, 1982), 9; C. Francome, Abortion 
Practice in Britain and the United States (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986), 55.  
 
41 MacIntyre (1977) n 39 above. 
 
42  See generally, L. Francke, The Ambivalence of Abortion (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980); A. Neustatter and 
G. Newson, Mixed Feelings: The Experience of Abortion (London, Sydney and New Hampshire: Pluto, 1986); D. 
Winn Experiences of Abortion (London: Macdonald Optima, 1988); V. Davies, Abortion and Afterwards (Bath: 
Ashgrove Press, 1991). 
 
43 Subsequently, for many years the proportion of terminations funded by the NHS settled at around, or just 
under, the 50% mark.  From 1992 onwards, however, the percentage of NHS funded terminations rose steadily 
from 57% in 1992 to nearly 98% today.  Over that same period, regional variation in the availability of NHS 
One research project brought together a group of doctors to consider the cases of women who had 
come to them requesting abortions from 1967-73.44  While this study was designed to explore a 
particular therapeutic model and draws on the experience of just sixteen doctors,45 it nonetheless 
provides an interesting insight into how the doctor’s role in this context was understood at the time, 
with the ‘first business of a doctor’ being ‘neither to accede willingly nor to reject niggardly’.46  Group 
members had struggled to reach a decision when faced with a woman requesting abortion. 
As they saw it, if they were too liberal and the woman was allowed to have an abortion, they might 
inhibit that side of her which was maturing.  On the other hand, if they were too restrictive, they had 
no real knowledge of what sort of future the unborn child might have and whether they might be 
making unreasonable demands on an unsupported mother […] It was also felt by many, particularly, by 
the women members of the Seminar, that the patient should have some say over what should happen 
to her body, i.e. that she should have some liberty in her choice.  However, it was considered by the 
majority that this freedom could not be accepted absolutely, because there were doubts in the doctors’ 
                                                          
funding has been greatly reduced: Department of Health, n 8.  On the role played by NHS reorganisation in 
driving this change, see Sheldon, n 8 above, 56-8.  On the significance of the growing numbers of NHS-funded 
abortions provided by non-NHS providers, see nn 50 and 62 and accompanying text, below. 
 
44 D. Tunnadine and R. Green Unwanted Pregnancy - Accident or Illness? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978) 
15.    
 
45 The study considered 147 case studies.  It was influenced by the work of the psychoanalyst, Dr Michael Balint, 
in seeking to understand the ‘whole person’ of the patients in all of their physical, mental and emotional aspects.   
Ibid. 
 
46 J.S. Norell, ‘Foreword’ in ibid, vii, vii. Norell was then Dean of Studies at the Royal College of General 
Practitioners. 
 
minds as to whether a woman in such a predicament would know what was in her best interests.  In 
other words, she might get what she wanted, but not what she needed.47  
Later the authors dismiss the case for ‘abortion on demand’, noting that ‘the decision is the doctor’s 
alone’ though he must ‘take note’ of the woman’s wishes.48   
The medical profession is a large and heterogeneous body and its members will inevitably hold a wide 
range of views on abortion and on the women who seek to end pregnancies.  Nonetheless, the medical 
paternalism implicit in the claims that to be forced to continue with a pregnancy might help a woman 
to ‘mature’ and that women facing unwanted pregnancies are not the best judges of their own best 
interests would undoubtedly be very widely perceived as an unacceptable anachronism today.   
Current Implementation: from Medical Paternalism to Patient Autonomy 
Modern abortion practice looks very different from that of the 1960s and 1970s.49  Abortion services 
are now firmly established as a routine part of mainstream NHS provision, albeit with a substantial 
proportion of those services provided under NHS contract by the independent charitable sector.50 
                                                          
47 ibid, 4.   
 
48 Ibid, 118. 
 
 
49 See Keown, above n 14, chapter 5, for an excellent, detailed account of how interpretation of the Abortion 
Act evolved over the 15 years following its introduction, tracing a significant relaxation in doctors’ attitudes.   
 
50 67% of abortion services in England and Wales were provided by independent providers in 2014, with 98% of 
these operating under NHS contract, see Department of Health, n 8 above.  In Scotland, abortions are provided 
within the NHS to approximately 18 weeks of gestation, after which point women travel to England for services, 
largely to independent sector providers, see C. Purcell, S. Cameron, L. Caird, G. Flett, G. Laird, C. Melville and L. 
M. McDaid ‘Access to and Experience of Later Abortion: Accounts from Women in Scotland’ (2014) 46(2) 
Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health 101–108.   
Numbers have stabilised at around 200,000 terminations per year, representing an abortion rate 
broadly in line with that seen in other Western countries and one which has been subject to a modest 
decline over the last few years.51  There is liberal access to abortion services within earlier pregnancy, 
when the large majority of terminations occur.52  In a very significant shift from the account provided 
above, contemporary doctors are likely to frame abortion decisions as properly belonging to pregnant 
women.53 While doctors may continue to form their own moral judgments regarding the validity of a 
woman’s reasons for seeking abortions,54 it appears rare for this to lead to a refusal of access to 
services.   Active dissuasion would also appear far less common. 
                                                          
 
51 15.9 resident women in England and Wales per 1000 aged 15-44.  This is the lowest rate for 16 years, 
Department of Health, ibid.  The rate for Scotland is 11.2 resident women per 1000, see ISD, n 8 above.  Globally, 
the age standardised abortion rate stood at around 28 per 1000 in 2008, with 24 per 1000 in developed countries 
or 17 per 1000 with Eastern Europe excluded, see G. Sedgh, S. Singh, I.H. Shah, E. Ahman, S.K. Henshaw, A. 
Bankole, ‘Induced Abortion: Incidence and Trends Worldwide from 1995 to 2008’ (2012) 379 (9816) Lancet 625. 
 
52 92% of abortions for women resident in England and Wales were carried out at under 13 weeks’ gestation, 
Department of Health, ibid. 
 
53 S.M. Beynon-Jones ‘Timing is Everything: the Demarcation of Later Abortions in Scotland’ (2012) 42(1) Soc 
Stud Sci 53. 
 
54 Benyon-Jones describes how Scottish health professionals involved in abortion provision construct ‘stratified’ 
expectations about women’s reproductive decision-making, with youth, age, parity and class mobilised as 
criteria through which to distinguish ‘types’ of patient whose requests for abortion are deemed particularly 
understandable or particularly problematic: S.M. Beynon-Jones ‘Expecting Motherhood? Stratifying 
Reproduction in 21st-century Scottish Abortion Practice’ (2012) 47(3) Sociology 509.   
The overwhelming majority of legal terminations are performed on the basis of the first ground of the 
Abortion Act.55  This permits an abortion to be authorised where two doctors form a good faith view 
that being forced to continue an unwanted pregnancy would be likely to pose a greater risk to a 
woman’s mental or physical health than would a termination.  Modern abortion procedures are very 
considerably safer than carrying a pregnancy to term and,  thus, in all cases there is a solid evidence 
base on which a doctor may reach a good faith determination that an early termination is indicated, 
as, statistically, posing a far lower risk to a woman’s physical health than continuing the pregnancy.  
While the so-called ‘statistical argument’ has been known for some decades,56 it has gained more 
force as the medical evidence base has developed over the lifetime of the Act.  One study carried out 
in the early years of the Abortion Act’s operation, found that within a sample of 1,317 women 
admitted for abortion, there had been one death and a morbidity rate of 16.8% (16,800 per 100,000).57  
                                                          
 
55 In 2014, 98% of abortions for English and Welsh resident women were carried out on the basis of s 1(1)(a) 
alone: Department of Health, n 8, 46. 
 
56 On the ‘statistical argument’, see Keown, n 14 above, 128-30, referencing G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal 
Law (London: Stevens, 2nd ed, 1983) 299. 
 
57 S. Sood ‘Some Operative and Postoperative Hazards of Legal Termination of Pregnancy’ (1971) 5782(4) BMJ 
270 (30 October), discussing patients admitted for NHS abortions from 1967-1970.  Sood reports a morbidity 
rate of 16.8%, with ‘morbidity’ defined to exclude urinary tract infection.  The following complications were 
most common: genital infection, chest infection, re-evacuation or perforation of the uterus and haemorrhage. 
Sood notes the following maternal death rates for legal abortions performed in 1970: 8.4/10,000 for abortions 
carried out by hysterotomy; 12.6/10,000 for abortion by hysterectomy; 2.2/10,000 by vacuum aspiration and 
0.9/10,000 for all other methods, including dilatation and curettage, at 270, citing the Chief Medical Officer’s 
Annual Report.  Tunnadine and Green note that in 1967 it was thought that there was an increased risk, if only 
a small one, in performing an abortion rather than allowing a pregnancy to continue to term, above n 44, 2.   
Today, one would expect to see a death rate of 0.32 per 100,000 women admitted for abortion 
(compared to 11.39 per 100,000 women who carry a pregnancy to term),58 with just 100-200 per 
100,000 suffering major complications that might require hospital care.59   
Further, changes to the structure of NHS funding introduced in the early 1990s made it impossible for 
senior doctors to block access to NHS funding for abortions simply by refusing to see them performed 
in ‘their’ hospitals.60  Today, regional disparities in the availability of NHS funding have largely 
evaporated and, with the very notable exception of Northern Irish women, almost all UK resident 
women seeking abortion will access state-funded services.61   
While the text of the Abortion Act has survived largely unchanged since 1967, abortion decisions are 
thus made within a radically different medical and institutional context and the reality of access to 
services in the first twenty-four weeks of pregnancy suggests that, in its interpretation, current 
regulation has evolved considerably.  It has been significant in this process that two-thirds of abortions 
are now performed by specialist charitable service providers that operate with an explicitly pro-choice 
                                                          
 
58 Centre for Maternal and Child Enquiries (CMACE) Saving Mothers’ Lives. Reviewing Maternal Deaths to make 
Motherhood Safer: 2006–2008 (2011) 118 BJOG (Suppl 1:1) 203.   
 
59 RCOG, n 9 above, 39s, citing a very small risk of haemorrhage, sepsis and uterine perforation. 
 
60 See Sheldon, n 8 above. 
 
61 R (A and B) v Secretary of State for Health [2014] EWHC 1364 (Admin).  For resident English and Welsh women, 
98% of abortions are NHS-funded.  Some regional disparity nonetheless persists in how early women are able to 
access services, with 89% of terminations in North Staffordshire but only 54% of those in the Vale of Glamorgan 
occurring at under 10 weeks: Department of Health, n 8 above. 
 
mandate.62  This means that the majority of women who access abortion services will today do so 
within a supportive, non-judgmental environment. Further, those healthcare professionals who have 
a conscientious objection to abortion have a statutorily entrenched right to opt out of service 
provision, leaving this work to colleagues who do not share their views.63 
The development of this permissive approach has not, however, gone unchallenged. As well as 
offering an important target for criticism outside of legal arena, occasional obiter references from the 
courts have suggested the law is now ‘wrongly, liberally construed in practice so as to make abortion 
available essentially on demand prior to 24 weeks with the approval of registered medical 
practitioners,’64 or that it is interpreted ‘so loosely that abortion has become obtainable virtually on 
demand.’65 A former Health Secretary went still further.  Responding to allegations that abortions had 
been authorised purely on the basis of a preference regarding the sex of the future child, Andrew 
Lansley berated the doctors involved as ‘people engaging in a culture of both ignoring the law and 
trying to give themselves the right to say that although Parliament may have said this, we believe in 
abortion on demand.’66   
                                                          
62 See n 43 above.  For the aims of the two major charitable providers of abortion services, see 
http://www.bpas.org/bpasabout/values; http://www.mariestopes.org.uk/aboutmariestopesuk (each last 
accessed 17 October 2015).     
 
63 s 4, Abortion Act.  See Doogan, n 27 above, for recent consideration of this provision. 
 
64R v Sarah Louise Catt, Sentencing Remarks (17 September 2012) at [15].   
 
65 Denning MR, RCN, n 10 above, 554. 
 
In support of such criticisms, it should be recalled that the Parliament that passed the 1967 Act was 
explicitly told that there was no intention to introduce abortion ‘on request’.67  However, Parliament 
also clearly intended that the statute should leave broad scope for the exercise of clinical discretion, 
with doctors charged with determining which abortions were ‘socially acceptable’ within the general 
grounds laid down in the Abortion Act.  It is this broad discretion that has permitted evolution in 
interpretation of the Abortion Act and the resulting liberal access to abortion.68  While the two judges 
cited above can thus coherently criticise a ‘loose’ or ‘liberal’ interpretation of the law (as, presumably, 
one that is contrary to their own moral views on abortion), Lansley fundamentally misunderstands the 
operation of the law when he speaks of doctors ‘ignoring’ it. Interpretation of statutory norms is 
neither fixed nor determinate but rather arises from shifting, contextually derived understandings and 
shared world views.69  In this specific context, evolving interpretations of the legislation have served 
to track not just broader shifts in moral attitudes to abortion,70 and the medical evidence base 
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67 See n 34 and accompanying text, above. 
 
68 Keown, n 14 above, 137. 
 
 
69 J. Black (1997) ‘New Institutionalism and Naturalism in Socio-Legal Analysis: Institutionalist Approaches to 
Regulatory Decision Making’ 19 Law & Policy 51, 52.   
 
70 In a representative sample of 953 adults, over half supported the view that ‘a woman should not have to 
continue with her pregnancy if she wants an abortion’ (15% very strongly agreed, 12% strongly agreed, 27% 
agreed and 17% disagreed). A second question, asked in the same survey, provided an even stronger response 
(perhaps reflecting a restrictive view of the appropriate role of government in this context): when asked to select 
the statement that best reflected their views, only 17% selected the statement that ‘the Government has a 
described above, but also an evolution in the ethical values that inform the doctor/patient 
relationship.  These values have shifted definitively away from the paternalism that informed the 
vision of doctors’ role at the time of the Abortion Act’s introduction.  
Today, the importance of respecting patient autonomy pervades the professional guidance available to 
doctors.  The GMC tells doctors that they have a duty to ‘work in partnership with patients’:   
 
Listen to, and respond to, their concerns and preferences.  Give patients the information they want or need 
in a way they can understand.  Respect patients’ right to reach decisions with you about their treatment 
and care.71  
It advises that ‘[t]he doctor may recommend a particular option which they believe to be best for the 
patient, but they must not put pressure on the patient to accept their advice.’72  Pregnant women are 
                                                          
responsibility to reduce the number of abortions’, compared to the 70% who chose the statement that ‘it’s a 
woman’s right to choose whether or not to have an abortion and the Government should not interfere.’  Ipsos 
MORI (2011) Public Attitudes towards Abortion, https://www.ipsos-
mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/2854/Public-Attitudes-towards-Abortion.aspx.  A second poll 
found that a similarly high proportion of those who identified as Christian (63%) agreed that, within the legal 
time limit, an adult woman with an unwanted pregnancy should be able to have an abortion if she wants one, 
compared to 20% against.  See Ipsos MORI for Richard Dawkins Foundation for Reason and Science (UK), 
Religious and Social Attitudes of UK Christians in 2011, https://www.ipsos-
mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/2921/Religious-and-Social-Attitudes-of-UK-Christians-in-
2011.aspx (each last accessed 17 October 2015).   
 
71 General Medical Council, Good Medical Practice (London, GMC: 2013), inside cover. 
 
72 General Medical Council, Consent: Patients and Doctors Making Decisions Together (London, GMC: London, 
GMC: 2008) at [5]. 
not an exception to this principle, with NICE guidelines regarding the provision of Caesarean section 
procedures stating that women ‘should be offered evidence-based information and support to enable 
them to make informed decisions about childbirth.’73 The importance of respecting autonomy in the 
abortion context, as in others, is implicit in the detailed RCOG guidance on the information of risks and 
side effects that doctors should offer their patients in order to ensure that the decision to terminate 
a pregnancy is properly informed;74 and explicit in guidance offered by the Royal College of General 
Practitioners: 
While the opinion and feelings of others will often form part of the picture for each woman, the [abortion] 
decision remains hers. It is important that the woman acknowledges the implications and responsibility of 
the decision.75 
The marked shift from a historical emphasis on the doctor’s duty of beneficence in medical decision-
making towards a more pronounced focus on patient autonomy, has been matched by a 
                                                          
 
73 National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, Caesarean Section: Clinical Guideline CG132 (London, NICE, 
2011).  The Guidelines also provide that: ‘[a] pregnant woman is entitled to decline the offer of treatment such 
as CS, even when the treatment would clearly benefit her or her baby's health. Refusal of treatment needs to 
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74 RCOG, n 9 above. 
 
75 Royal College of General Practitioners, RCGP Position Statement on Abortion (London, RCGP, 2012).  
http://www.rcgp.org.uk/policy/rcgp-policy-areas/~/media/Files/Policy/A-Z-
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corresponding development in the relevant legal standards.76  An illustration of the distance that has 
been travelled was recently and powerfully provided in Montgomery.77  Previously, it had been 
accepted that a doctor might lawfully omit to warn a patient of the risks involved in a proposed treatment, 
provided always that such an omission was accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical 
opinion.78  Rejecting the professional practice test in this context, a seven judge Supreme Court was 
unanimous in holding that the paternalistic vision that underpinned it had long ‘ceased to reflect the 
reality and complexity of the way in which healthcare services are provided’, with patients ‘now widely 
regarded as persons holding rights, rather than as the passive recipients of the care of the medical 
profession.’79  As the leading judgment recognised, ‘social and legal developments … point away from a 
model of the relationship between the doctor and patient based upon medical paternalism’:80 
What they point towards is an approach to the law which, instead of treating patients as placing themselves 
in the hands of their doctors […] treats them so far as possible as adults who are capable of understanding 
                                                          
76 For a sustained critique of this trend, see C. Foster, Choosing Life, Choosing Death: the Tyranny of Autonomy 
in Medical Ethics and Law (Oxford: Hart, 2009). 
 
77 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11.  For a compelling early analysis of the tension between 
abortion legislation and the increasingly strong commitment to patient autonomy in medical law, see E. Jackson 
‘Abortion, Autonomy and Prenatal Diagnosis’ (2000) 9 SLS 467.   
  
78 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] UKHL 1. 
 
79 Montgomery, n 77 above, at [75]. 
 
80 ibid, at [81]. 
 
that medical treatment is uncertain of success and may involve risks, accepting responsibility for the taking 
of risks affecting their own lives, and living with the consequences of their choices.81 
 
Again, it is clear from Montgomery, which turned upon a woman’s right to make an informed choice 
between a vaginal and Caesarean delivery, that pregnant women are not to be treated as a legal exception 
to the principle of respect for patient autonomy.  This is so even in those situations where treatment 
decisions will have a significant impact on fetal health or survival: a competent pregnant woman has an 
absolute right to refuse even those medical interventions that her doctors deem essential to save her 
own life and that of a full term fetus.82 The fact of being pregnant:  
does not diminish [a woman’s] entitlement to decide whether or not to undergo medical treatment […] 
Her right is not reduced or diminished merely because her decision to exercise it may appear morally 
repugnant.83 
Finally, it has also been suggested that current legal requirements regarding the need for two doctors to 
authorise a termination are importantly out of line with the UK’s obligations under human rights law.84 
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82 George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1988] 3 WLR 936; Re MB (Caesarean Section) [1997] EWCA Civ 1361. 
 
83 George’s, ibid, 957. 
 
84 R. Scott, ‘Risks, Reasons, and Rights: the European Convention on Human Rights and English Abortion Law’ 
(forthcoming) Med L Rev.  Scott argues that to make access to lawful abortion within early pregnancy conditional 
on fulfilment of the terms of s 1(1)(a) is an unjustified interference with a woman’s private life under Article 8 
of the European Convention on Human Rights.  She also raises concerns regarding the lack of a system of formal 
review in the event that doctors decide not to grant a termination.   
 
Clearly, evolutions in jurisprudence and professional guidelines cannot overrule statutory provisions, 
however anomalous the requirements of the Abortion Act might appear in the context of modern medical 
law.85  But this broader context of medical practice and the ethical norms which guide it will inevitably 
and entirely appropriately influence how doctors interpret the terms of the Abortion Act.  Indeed, while 
a conscientious objector has a legal right to opt out of providing abortion services,86 the doctor who sees 
his or her role as involving dissuasion, cajolement, prevarication or refusal to provide information in order 
to block or delay access to abortion services requested within the legal time limits would today potentially 
stand in serious breach of the above professional guidance and, following Montgomery, the law of 
negligence.   
Further, it cannot be assumed that taking a liberal interpretation of the law is obviously subversive of 
its intended purpose.  While Parliament did not intend to legislate for ‘abortion on request’, it did 
intend that the ‘great social responsibility’ of determining what abortions would be permitted within 
the broad terms of the legislation should be placed firmly ‘on the shoulders of the medical 
profession’,87 deliberately providing for local, contingent decision-making.  Five decades on, when 
doctors take a permissive view of who should be granted access to abortion services within the terms 
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86 s 4(1), Abortion Act 1967. 
 
87  R v Smith [1974] 1 All ER 376 (CA): ‘the legality of an abortion depends on the opinion of the doctor.  It has 
introduced the safeguard of two opinions: but, if they are formed in good faith by the time the operation is 
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and Re X (a Child) [2014] EWHC 1871 (Fam). 
 
of the legislation, this serves to recognise, first, ‘the statistical argument’ regarding the relatively 
greater clinical risks of continued pregnancy compared to termination; second, the significant shifts in 
medical practice towards respect for patient autonomy; and, third, contemporary ethical views on 
abortion which, over the five decades since the Act was passed, have shifted firmly towards a more 
permissive stance.88  As such, where a doctor believes in good faith that a ‘socially acceptable’ abortion 
is rendered such purely on the basis that a woman has made an informed decision that she does not 
wish to continue with a pregnancy, he or she has a solid legal basis for authorising a termination.  
Ongoing Challenges for Regulation 
This conclusion nonetheless sits in clear tension with a legal framework that requires abortion 
decisions to be made by two doctors, raising an important issue regarding the ongoing role played by 
this requirement in the context of modern abortion services.  This issue was at the heart of recent 
controversy regarding the revelation that some doctors were ‘pre-signing’ the HSA1 forms, which 
provide formal notification that a termination has been authorised, without having first considered 
any information relating to the specific pregnant woman to be treated.   Concerned about this 
practice, then Health Secretary Andrew Lansley, ordered the Care Quality Commission (CQC) to carry 
out a spontaneous, mass inspection of abortion clinics.  Early leaked accounts reported a ‘scandal’ that 
around one fifth of inspected clinics were breaking the law by pre-signing forms, with many said to be 
likely to be stripped of the licences permitting them to offer abortions.89   This was not born out in the 
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final report issued by the CQC, which cited pre-signing at just 14 (6%) of 249 inspected clinics, all of 
which were NHS Trusts, and none of which were found to have provided poor care to their patients.90 
The legality of ‘pre-signing’ is moot.91 The Abortion Act requires doctors to provide notification that 
an abortion has been authorised but makes no specific provision for when certification should take 
place, beyond the requirement that doctors must form an opinion in ‘good faith’.  Statutory 
Regulations provide that any certificate of an opinion must be given before the termination takes 
place but are silent on the question of it should be signed.92 However, the controversy surrounding 
pre-signing is interesting for the broader issue perceived to be at stake: the accusation that the doctors 
involved were ‘rubber stamping’ the forms and abdicating the decision-making role foreseen for them 
in the 1967 Act.93   
Concerns regarding pre-signing were one factor in the Department of Health’s decision to issue further 
Guidance in Relation to Requirements of the Abortion Act 1967.94  The Guidance offers a restrictive 
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(last accessed 17 October 2015).   
  
91 See generally D. Flower, ‘Certifying Abortions: the Signing of HSA1 Forms’ in bpas, Britain’s Abortion Law: 
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92 Abortion Regulations 1991 (S.I. No. 1991/499).   
 
93 S. Wollaston ‘Abortion Law is no longer Fit for Purpose’ Guardian (24 April 2014); Department of Health, 
Guidance in Relation to Requirements of the Abortion Act 1967 (London: Department of Health, 2014) at [20]. 
 
94 Department of Health, ibid. 
reading of requirements regarding doctors’ decision-making.   First, it finds pre-signing of forms 
(without subsequent consideration of any information relating to the woman) to be incompatible with 
the requirements of the Abortion Act.95  Pre-signing is said to call into question whether a doctor could 
turn his or her mind to a specific woman’s circumstances and form a good faith opinion about which, 
if any, of the lawful grounds under the Abortion Act might apply.96   The Guidance also advises that a 
doctor must make an individual assessment of the woman requesting an abortion, rather than relying 
on the assessment of other members of the multi-disciplinary healthcare team.97  Finally, it notes that, 
whilst not strictly legally required, it is nonetheless ‘good practice’ for at least one of the doctors who 
authorises an abortion to see the pregnant woman in person.98   
The claim that a doctor must be able to turn his or her mind to a specific woman’s circumstances in 
order to form a ‘good faith’ determination is said to reflect Parliament’s intention that each doctor 
should consider the woman’s individual circumstances.99  Such a reading gains support from the 
general schema of the Act: the fact that each individual request for abortion must be judged to fit 
within one of four broad grounds implies that an individualised assessment is required, as does the 
                                                          
 





97 ibid, at [12], [20] and [21]. 
 
98 ibid, at [6]. 
 
99 Flower, n 91 above. 
 
 
recognition that the two doctors may find that different grounds are met.100  The fact that the HSA1 
form requires the name and address of the woman to be listed also points in this direction.101   
However, while the concept of ‘good faith’ clearly place limits on how a doctor’s judgment may be 
reached,102 it is not self-evident that either a literal or purposive interpretation of the Act requires an 
individualised assessment.  Here, it is noteworthy that the legislation specifically allowed broad scope 
for clinical discretion, leaving the question of how a decision should be reached to the doctors 
involved.  It is arguable that a ‘good faith’ opinion that abortion is justifiable in all cases could be 
reached on the basis of the relative risks to a women’s mental or physical health (for the latter, relying 
on the ‘statistical argument’ set out above).103    
Further, even assuming that the Guidance is correct to assert that an individual assessment of a 
woman’s case by two doctors was intended by Parliament, it might be argued that any such intention 
on this specific issue would have been grounded in the broader belief that this scrutiny was necessary 
to meet the over-arching purposes of the legislation.  Yet there is no reason to believe that the goal 
of ensuring that ‘socially acceptable abortions should be carried out under the safest conditions 
attainable’104 is furthered by the restrictive interpretation of the law offered in the Guidance.  Notably, 
there is no indication that the Government intends to reinforce the doctor’s gatekeeper role as a 
means of restricting access to services and reducing numbers of abortions.  There is nothing in the 
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103 Flower, n 91 above, 25; on the ‘statistical argument’ see generally n 56 and accompanying text above. 
 
 
104 RCN, n 10 above, 575. 
 
Guidance that would suggest a desire to return to the era where the doctor’s proper function was 
understood as managing a woman’s pregnancy in the sense of refusing to allow her to make key 
decisions about it: indeed, the need for the provision of impartial information to women is explicitly 
recognised.105   Further, the Guidance makes no suggestion that greater scrutiny might serve to 
improve abortion services, either in terms of the safety or support of women seeking terminations, or 
in ensuring that abortion decisions are well informed, non-coerced and carefully considered.  And, as 
noted above, the CQC inspection into pre-signing found no evidence of poor care to patients. Yet if 
these broad policy arguments are not to be invoked in favour of a tighter level of medical control, then 
a restrictive interpretation of the doctors’ role within the regulatory structure appears to be asserted 
as an end in its own right. 
Neither is it clear why a face to face assessment should be thought ‘good practice’ in this context 
while, in others, doctors are encouraged to work collaboratively as part of a multi-disciplinary team 
and to rely on information gathered and assessments made by their colleagues.106  In the abortion 
context, an increasingly significant role has come to be played by nurses and counsellors, who should 
be appropriately skilled in ensuring that a woman’s decision is firm, considered and non-coerced, and 
in identifying any exceptional medical circumstances that would require the specialist input of a 
doctor.  As will be discussed in more detail below, the importance of multi-disciplinary team working 
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106 See GMC (2013), n 71 above, s 35, providing that ‘[y]ou must work collaboratively with colleagues, respect 
their skills and contributions”.  It is noteworthy that there was some inconsistency in the interpretation of the 
law taken in recent CQC inspections, with some inspectors seeing it as a breach of the rules for a doctor to sign 
a HSA1 form without seeing a woman’s records, while others did not.  Flower, n 91 above, 26, argues that it is 
‘simply not for the regulator to prescribe how any individual doctor reaches his decision in good faith.’  
 
has been elsewhere emphasised by the Department of Health and accepted in judicial interpretation 
of the Act, provided that a doctor remains in overall control of the abortion procedure.107 
Maintaining compliance with regulation entails building a shared view of what that regulation means, 
with a stable and effective regulatory system achieved only where there is broad acceptance of the 
values that underpin the regulatory norms.108  In seeking to impose a more restrictive reading of the 
legislation by simple assertion, with limited reference to the purposes underpinning it, the 
Government here fails to address the issues that would tend to a culture of ‘rubber stamping’. Rather, 
in a broader context of evidence-based medicine where protocols are developed on the basis of 
clinical need, it risks reinforcing a view of certification paperwork as an anomalous, bureaucratic 
measure, required merely to comply with legal requirements.   More generally, the above analysis 
highlights the scope for disagreement regarding the appropriate interpretation of the law.  The lack 
of clarity is a particularly egregious failing in a law backed by such onerous criminal sanction.  
On other occasions, far from advocating a restrictive reading of the legislation, the Department of Health 
has accepted a broad, purposive interpretation of the Abortion Act that seeks to avoid the imposition 
of clinically unjustified restrictions on good practice. However, as will be seen next, while taking a 
purposive interpretation of the Act may paper over the cracks in the regulatory framework, it cannot 
address the underlying tensions that are causing them to appear.   
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A PREGNANCY MUST BE ‘TERMINATED BY A REGISTERED MEDICAL PRACTITIONER’ 
In order for an abortion to be lawful, a second requirement of the Abortion Act must also be met: the 
pregnancy must be ‘terminated by a registered medical practitioner.’109  This provision reflected the 
desire to take abortions out of the backstreets, ensuring that they would be performed safely by 
appropriately skilled professionals.110  In 1967, legal abortions were far riskier, technically more 
demanding procedures ‘done by surgical methods’, with the ‘knife with the cutting edge’ of necessity 
‘operated by a registered medical practitioner’.111  In the years immediately following the introduction 
of the Act, however, a far safer, technically less demanding means of performing early abortions – by 
vacuum aspiration – quickly became widespread, already rendering the need for the skilled hand of a 
doctor less self-evident.112  Today, medical abortion accounts for over half of all legal abortions 
                                                          
109 s 1(1). 
 
110 Lord Denning MR suggests that it was also deemed necessary to protect nurses, who he assumes to be young, 
vulnerable and opposed to abortion, by requiring those doctors minded to prescribe abortions to be prepared 
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111 ibid, 554.  While Lord Denning restricts his remarks here to the second trimester terminations at issue in the 
case before him, the same radical changes in abortion technology are equally marked at other stages of 
gestation. 
 
112 Vacuum aspiration involves gentle suction to remove the foetus from the womb and is used until 
approximately fifteen weeks of pregnancy.  It typically takes less than five minutes.  It was introduced to much 
of the English-speaking world by D. Kerslake and D. Casey ‘Abortion induced by means of uterine aspiration’ 
performed in the UK, with most of the other half provided by vacuum aspiration, and less than one in 
twenty relying on more technically demanding methods.113   Here, I consider three different abortion 
procedures, each of which raises important questions as to how this provision should be interpreted 
in the light of evolving medical technologies.  
Second Trimester Medical Abortion by Prostaglandin Infusion: RCN v DHSS (1981) 
By the early 1980s, it was accepted practice for second trimester medical terminations using 
prostaglandins (drugs that cause uterine contractions) to be conducted largely by nursing staff.  The 
doctor would insert a catheter into the womb, leaving nurses or midwives to attach it to a pump, add 
the necessary prostaglandin infusion, switch the pump on, monitor the patient’s vital signs, adjust the 
flow of the drug, and add fresh supplies as necessary over the 18-30 hours that it might take for a 
miscarriage to occur.  While the doctor would be available to be called if necessary, he or she would 
not routinely be present on the ward.114   
 Department of Health Guidance asserting the legality of this procedure was challenged by the Royal 
College of Nursing, which was concerned regarding the potential legal liability of its members in the 
event that the Guidance was incorrect.  The issue that came before the courts in RCN was thus the 
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113 Medical abortions accounted for 51% of the total number of abortions performed in England and Wales in 
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114 See RCN n 10 above, 821. 
 
following: where the only steps that directly cause an abortion are carried out by a nurse or midwife, 
is the pregnancy ‘terminated by a registered medical practitioner’?115  
The courts’ response was finely balanced.116  However, a slim majority in the House of Lords accepted 
the Department of Health’s broad, purposive interpretation of the Abortion Act, reading the 
requirement that a pregnancy be terminated by a registered medical practitioner to mean that a 
doctor ‘should accept responsibility’ for all stages of treatment for the termination of pregnancy, 
without necessarily needing to carry out specific actions him or herself.117  Lord Diplock explained: 
The particular method to be used should be decided by the doctor in charge of the treatment for 
termination of the pregnancy; he should carry out any physical acts, forming part of the treatment, that 
in accordance with accepted medical practice are done only by qualified medical practitioners, and 
should give specific instructions as to the carrying out of such parts of the treatment as in accordance 
with accepted medical practice are carried out by nurses or other members of the hospital staff without 
medical qualifications. To each of them, the doctor, or his substitute, should be available to be 
consulted or called on for assistance from beginning to end of the treatment.118  
This broad reading of the provision allowed the then existing medical practice to be maintained.   
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116 Woolf J (at first instance) and Lords Diplock, Keith and Roskill (in the House of Lords) concluded in favour of 
the Department’s position.  Lord Denning MR, Brightman LJ and Sir George Baker P (in the Court of Appeal) and 
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117 RCN n 10 above, per Lord Diplock, 569. See further, Lord Keith, 575; Lord Roskill, 577. 
 
118 ibid, Lord Diplock, 569-70.    
 
Early Medical Abortion 
While the RCN case concerned second trimester inductions, it has assumed particular contemporary 
significance with regard to early medical abortion.  This was foreseen by Woolf J, at first instance.  
No doubt the time is not far ahead when a pregnancy can be terminated merely by the patient taking 
a pill.  If in such circumstances the doctor, having examined the patient, decides that it is a case where 
in accordance with s.1 the pregnancy should be terminated, and he complies with the other conditions 
of s.1, then the fact that the pill may be handed to the patient by the nurse rather than the doctor so 
that the patient can take the pill will not mean that the treatment is not that of the doctor.119 
While prescient regarding future developments in medical science, however, the legal issue is less 
clear cut than Woolf J here assumes.  A contrary interpretation is offered by the authoritative legal 
commentators, Ian Kennedy and Andrew Grubb, who query whether terminations would be lawful 
where drugs are prescribed by a doctor, dispensed by a pharmacist but self-administered by a woman. 
Legally, the situation is analogous to a case where a doctor provides the means (eg pills) for a patient 
to kill himself.  It is the patient who commits suicide.  The doctor is guilty of assisting suicide, if anything.  
It cannot be said that he is guilty of murder since the law regards the patient’s own actions as the cause 
of death.  Mutatis mutandis, here the woman causes her own termination.  The provisions of the 
Abortion Act would not be complied with.120 
Distinguishing RCN, Kennedy and Grubb suggest that a doctor’s ‘responsibility’ for the patient during 
an early medical abortion does not involve the ‘right to control those who acted on his behalf in a 
professional capacity.’121  It rather intends a relationship that is ‘neither one of control nor one where 
                                                          
119 ibid, 553.   
 
120 I. Kennedy and A. Grubb, Medical Law: Text and Materials (London: Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2000) 1478.    
 
121 ibid, 1479.   
the patient (in administering the drug to herself) can be said to act on the doctor’s behalf or be in his 
charge.’122  A woman does not, as does a nurse, act ‘in a ministerial capacity’ for the doctor.123  
Kennedy and Grubb conclude that it is unlikely that a future court would further expand the meaning 
of the 1967 Act to cover this situation.124 
In their analysis, Kennedy and Grubb assume that the misoprostol used in the second stage of an early 
medical abortion is administered by a nurse.125  As such, they raise a concern only with regard to what 
they estimate to be around 3% of cases, where a woman’s miscarriage is provoked by (self-
administered) mifepristone alone, with no need for the second (nurse-administered) stage of the 
treatment.126  Today, however, misoprostol tablets are typically inserted by the woman herself.127 This 
remains true not just for the early abortions discussed by Kennedy and Grubb but also for many of 
those performed later in pregnancy, where the preferred treatment regime has evolved significantly 
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127 A healthcare professional – typically a nurse – would only insert the tablets in rare cases, for example where 
a woman is uncomfortable in touching her own genitals.   Personal communication, Dr Patricia A. Lohr, Medical 
Director, bpas.  
 
from that described in RCN.128  It should further be noted that the physical involvement of the doctor 
under such protocols is likely to be even more minimal than that described in RCN, with no ‘hands on’ 
involvement and, other than prescribing drugs and giving instruction, no role in ‘initiating’ 
treatment.129   
If Kennedy and Grubb’s analysis is correct, then, its implications are significant.  Given that, ex 
hypothesi, the woman would be held to have terminated her own pregnancy, it would mean that the 
large majority of medical abortions performed in the first trimester of pregnancy, and many of those 
performed later, would potentially constitute serious criminal offences. It seems unlikely that the 
public interest threshold for a prosecution would be met in the context of otherwise lawful 
terminations performed with due regard to patient safety.  However, if a court were persuaded to 
issue a declaration that abortions provided under these protocols are unlawful, this would have a very 
significant effect in restricting the way in which medical terminations might be offered. The lack of 
clarity on this point is thus troubling, particularly given how finely balanced were the judgments in 
RCN.   
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129 While a requirement of ‘initiation’ does not figure in the language of the House of Lords judgments in RCN,  
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specifically with the then contemporary practice regarding late medical inductions at dispute in RCN (where a 
doctor would have inserted the catheter into the womb) in mind.   
 
On balance, it is likely that the courts would refuse Kennedy and Grubb’s analysis of the law, preferring 
to take a broad, common sense reading of the Abortion Act.  This would avoid an interpretation that 
would be highly disruptive to the organisation of current, safe accepted practice.130  It would also avoid 
the absurdity of legally requiring a health professional to place tablets in a woman’s mouth or vagina 
rather than allowing her so to place them herself.  While the only judicial dicta on this point emanates 
from the lower courts, it is significant that it assumes the legality of this practice.131  Finally, it is also 
noteworthy that no query was raised regarding the legality of ‘self-administration’ of abortion drugs 
in a far more recent case, despite the repeated use of that term in written submissions to the Court.132 
Vacuum Aspiration 
However, the analysis cannot stop there.  If the absurdity of a legal requirement that would require a 
doctor (or another healthcare professional acting under her or his guidance) to place tablets inside a 
woman’s body is likely to be avoided by a common sense, purposive interpretation of the relevant 
statutory provision, then the same approach should also pertain with regard to other kinds of abortion 
method. For example, vacuum aspiration is an extremely safe and technically undemanding 
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procedure, which accounts for just under half of abortions performed in England and Wales.133  
Currently, all vacuum aspiration procedures are performed by doctors, as this has been assumed to 
be necessary to meet the requirement that a pregnancy be ‘terminated by a registered medical 
practitioner’. The House of Commons Science & Technology Committee proceeded on this assumption 
in its review of the Abortion Act.134   Likewise, the Faculty of Sexual and Reproductive Health currently 
restricts training in vacuum aspiration to doctors, citing RCN as authority for its belief that ‘[b]y current 
law, nurses and midwives are unable to perform abortion procedures’.135   
However, following RCN and subject always to the clinical safety of such a move, it is far from clear 
why vacuum aspirations might not be legally performed by an appropriately trained and skilled nurse 
acting as part of a multi-disciplinary team that includes a doctor.136  The doctor’s role in deciding upon 
treatment and giving any necessary, specific instructions as to how it should be carried out would be 
exactly the same.  Further, as for a medical abortion, the doctor or her substitute would be available 
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Abortion Act 1967 (Twelfth Report of Session 2006-7) Volume 1, HC 1045-1 (2007) 108-9. 
 
 
135 Although they can ‘provide the medication prescribed by the doctor for medical abortions and assist in the 
provision of surgical procedures’.  Faculty of Sexual and Reproductive Health of the Royal College of 
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, Syllabus and Logbook for the Certificate in Abortion Care of the Faculty of 
Sexual and Reproductive Healthcare of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (London: FRSA, 
undated, http://www.fsrh.org/pdfs/AbortionCareLogbook.pdf),  4 (last accessed 17 October 2015).   
 
136 See V. Argent and L. Pavey ‘Can Nurses Legally Perform Surgical Induced Abortion?’ (2007) 33(2) J Fam Plann 
Reprod Health Care 79. 
 
to be consulted or called on for assistance from beginning to end of the treatment.  While it might 
appear a greater stretch of the statutory language to interpret medical direction and oversight as 
sufficient to constitute ‘performance’ of a hands on, surgical procedure (rather than the handing over 
of drugs), it should be recalled that, on its facts, RCN was also concerned with the performance of 
physical acts.   
In RCN, Lord Roskill is silent regarding the issue of hands on involvement of the doctor, rather 
reasoning that the legal requirement is met when the ‘entirety of the treatment for the termination 
of pregnancy and [the nurse’s] participation in it is at all times under the control of the doctor even 
though the doctor is not present throughout the entirety of the treatment.’137  Lord Keith notes merely 
that the doctor must ‘personally [perform] essential parts of it which are such as to necessitate the 
application of his particular skill’,138 implicitly accepting that this question should be resolved with 
regard to a current medical evidence base.   Lord Diplock likewise notes that ‘the doctor need not do 
everything with his own hands’, rather emphasising that the treatment must be ‘carried out in 
accordance with his directions’ and that a doctor must remain ‘in charge throughout.’139  Each of these 
readings would appear to support the legality of permitting appropriately trained nurses and midwives 
to perform vacuum aspirations. 
The Supreme Court has also more recently summarised RCN as providing that the statutory 
requirement is met: 
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when [the abortion] was a team effort carried out under [the doctor’s] direction, with the doctor 
performing those tasks that are reserved to a doctor and the nurses and others carrying out those tasks 
which they are qualified to perform.140  
The opposition in the final sentence might be taken to imply that ‘reserved to a doctor’ is appropriately 
understood as meaning those tasks which the doctor alone is qualified to perform.  Alternatively, it 
might be understood as referring to those aspects of treatment that are legally reserved to a doctor, 
such as certification requirements and the right to prescribe certain drugs (including the mifepristone 
and misoprostol used in a medical abortion).141   Significantly, however, the Court did not read the 
Abortion Act as requiring that a doctor perform any specific physical tasks. 
Do vacuum aspirations fall within those tasks that nurses and midwives are ‘qualified to perform’?  
First, they would clearly require appropriate training.142  Further, a British pilot might be considered 
desirable before any innovation in practice is rolled out more generally.  However, extensive 
international evidence suggests that this development would be safe.143  While in 1967 it was 
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143The World Health Organisation recommends that vacuum aspiration can be safely provided by associate 
clinicians, midwives, and nurses. See WHO (2015) Health Worker Roles in Providing Safe Abortion Care and Post-
Abortion Contraception, http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/publications/unsafe_abortion/abortion-task-
shifting/en/ (last accessed 17 October 2015) describing how, in many parts of the world, vacuum aspirations are 
already offered by midlevel providers, with similar safety records to those enjoyed by doctors.  See further T.A. 
Weitz, D. Taylor, S. Desai, U.D. Upadhyay, J. Waldman, M.F. Battistelli, E.A. Drey, ‘Safety of Aspiration Abortion 
Performed by Nurse Practitioners, Certified Nurse Midwives, and Physician Assistants under a California Legal 
Waiver’ (2013) 103(3) Am J Public Health 454; I.K. Warriner, O. Meirik, M. Hoffman, C. Morroni, J. Harries, N.T. 
uncommon for these staff to perform surgical procedures, today they perform a range of complex 
procedures including colposcopies and hysteroscopies.144 They also fit contraceptive coils, which is 
said to require about the same level of skill as vacuum aspiration.145  Whether they might conduct 
other kinds of procedures would turn on the question of safety and, on this basis, later surgical 
procedures may continue to require the skilled hand of an experienced doctor.146  It seems reasonable 
to suggest, however, that these questions are best answered through robust scrutiny of the 
contemporary medical evidence.   
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While the above analysis presents a clear challenge to the current, received interpretation of the law 
in practice, it does nothing more than to follow to its logical conclusion the broad, purposive approach 
of the House of Lords in RCN.  Notably, recognising that appropriately trained midlevel providers could 
lawfully offer vacuum aspirations would have no impact on the first of those purposes (broadening 
the grounds under which abortions are available) and should be permitted only if it can be 
demonstrated not to offend against the second (ensuring that abortions are performed safely and 
hygienically).147 There is nothing inherently unsafe about permitting a woman to put tablets into her 
own mouth or vagina, rather than allowing a healthcare professional so to place them. Likewise, if 
vacuum aspirations can be safely and effectively performed by appropriately trained and skilled non-
doctors, then there appears to be no good reason against accommodating this practice within the 
existing statutory framework.   In the light of such a broad reading, however, given a general 
expectation within health care that specific tasks should be undertaken only by those with the 
requisite skills and training, the statutory requirement that a termination be performed by a registered 
medical practitioner appears largely redundant. 
ANY ‘TREATMENT FOR THE TERMINATION OF PREGNANCY’ MUST BE CARRIED OUT 
ON NHS PREMISES OR IN ANOTHER APPROVED PLACE 
Finally, the Abortion Act places restrictions on where terminations may be lawfully performed.148  This 
provision was crafted to ensure that services were offered openly, only in those locations with the 
facilities necessary for their safe performance.  Five decades on, the goal of discouraging clandestine 
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148 s 1(3), as amended 1990. 
 
terminations has been largely achieved through the provision of high-quality, NHS-funded services.149  
Further, many abortion services rely heavily on early medical abortion, which can generally be 
performed safely with no need for specialist facilities (provided that appropriate aftercare can be 
accessed in the rare event of serious complications). Indeed, in anticipation of such developments, 
the Abortion Act was amended in 1990 specifically to provide a power for the Secretary of State for 
Health to approve a ‘class of places’ (for example, GPs’ surgeries) for the termination of pregnancy 
using drugs.150  Twenty-five years on, this power has never been used.  
Home Use of Misoprostol: BPAS v Secretary of State for Health (2011) 
The place of provision requirement was at the heart of a legal challenge brought by BPAS, Britain’s 
largest charitable abortion provider.151  Faced with the refusal of successive governments to make use 
of the power to license a broader ‘class of places’ for early medical abortion, BPAS argued that such 
an extension was, in any case, unnecessary.  It suggested that the term ‘treatment’ within the Abortion 
Act should be understood to mean only prescription and supply of a drug, in the sense that a doctor 
might treat a migraine merely by prescribing medication rather than by actually administering it.152  
As such, it claimed, while prescription must take place on approved premises, a woman might take 
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mifepristone, the first drug used in a medical abortion, in the clinic and take away the second, 
misoprostol, for later use at home.153 
BPAS’s argument played heavily on the common sense intuition that the more restrictive 
interpretation of the ‘place of provision’ requirement – requiring a woman to return to the clinic in 
order to take the misoprostol on approved premises before, in many cases, leaving immediately in 
order to arrive home before her miscarriage began – offended against common sense. BPAS also 
emphasised the significant shifts in abortion technologies and practice that had occurred both since 
1967 and, indeed, since the Abortion Act was amended in 1990.154  Clinical evidence was advanced 
from a number of other countries to demonstrate the safety, effectiveness and acceptability of home 
use.  BPAS suggested that once women have understood the simple treatment regime involved (in 
terms of quantities and frequency of administration), they are not in need of supervision while they 
take the drugs.155 Indeed, those women who use misoprostol to ensure the completion of a 
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154 In 1990, British clinics performed early medical abortions using mifepristone in combination with gemeprost, 
a prostaglandin analogue known to have unpleasant side effects and to require storage at less than 10 degrees 
Celsius until warming 30 minutes prior to use.  This suggested a clinical need for use of the drugs to be supervised 
in the clinic.  This changed with the introduction of misoprostol, when ‘[e]arly medical abortion was transformed 
from a painful, unpleasant, resource-intensive and costly procedure into what it is today: a procedure that still 
involves pain and bleeding, but which can be reasonably well managed and controlled’. See generally, J. Bristow, 
‘Misoprostol and the Transformation of the ‘Abortion Pill,’ ‘Abortion Review (26 January 2011), 
http://www.abortionreview.org/index.php/site/article/908/ (last accessed 17 October 2015).   
 
155  See further, T.D. Ngo, M.H. Park, H. Shakur, C. Free ‘Comparative Effectiveness, Safety and Acceptability of 
Medical Abortion at Home and in a Clinic: a Systematic Review’ (2011)  89(5) Bulletin of the World Health 
spontaneous miscarriage already commonly take the drug at home.156  Finally, it noted that home use 
is preferred by many women, partly for the convenience of eliminating the need for a second visit to 
a clinic and partly for avoiding the risk of miscarriage during the journey home.157 There was thus ‘no 
sensible reason why Parliament would wish to prevent women who have met the criteria of the 1967 
Act and wish to take the misoprostol safely at home, from doing so.’158  BPAS argued that the first 
purpose of the Abortion Act (broadening the grounds on which abortions might lawfully be offered) 
was irrelevant to the interpretation of the specific provision under dispute, which concerned not 
whether but how abortions might be performed. The place of provision requirement, it suggested, 
should thus be interpreted merely with reference to the second purpose of the Act: to ensure that 
abortions are performed safely. 
While accepting that the international data offered a prima facie case for the safety of home use,159 
the Government responded that a pilot study would be necessary before it could be adopted in Britain 
(finding no apparent irony in advancing this argument when such a study was blocked only by its own 
refusal to approve a broader ‘class of places’).160  However, it relied primarily on the first purpose of 
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the Abortion Act in opposing BPAS’s claim, arguing that the widening of access to abortion envisaged 
in the Act was not without limits and the power to licence a broader ‘class of places’ had been 
deliberately left as a matter for political control.  Thus, if the Court were to issue the declaration sought 
by BPAS, ‘[i]t would represent, in a highly controversial area, a very significant shift of responsibility 
from the democratically elected and accountable Secretary of State to the medical profession.’161 
Further, the Act had been specifically amended in 1990, not to permit the provision of abortion 
anywhere safe to do so, but rather to allow a future government ‘to react to further changes in medical 
science’ and ‘to approve a wider range of place, including potentially the home’.162   
The Court preferred the Government’s reading of the law, finding that the words ‘any treatment for 
the termination of pregnancy’ must include not just the prescription but also the administration of an 
abortion drug, which should, therefore, take place on approved premises.  This is a plausible 
interpretation (particularly given the amendment introduced in 1990), which offers a literal reading 
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of the provision.163  However, eschewing the broad, purposive approach adopted in RCN, it leaves 
unaddressed the question of what exactly is ‘politically sensitive’ about home use of misoprostol in 
the context of a safe, legally authorised abortion.  In making this claim, it is noteworthy that the 
Government did not rely on the kinds of arguments advanced in early pro-life campaigns against the 
licensing of mifepristone: that abortion services should not be made too ‘convenient’ for women, or 
that abortion drugs risk ‘trivialising’ abortion, making it ‘like taking an aspirin’, and potentially leading 
to a relaxation of attitudes towards abortion.164  Neither did it suggest that early abortion could not 
be successfully managed by women at home.165  Nor, indeed, were these kinds of arguments relied 
upon by the leading pro-life charity that intervened in the case: SPUC rather disputed the evidence 
regarding the safety of the drugs and raised concerns that taking a very narrow reading of the term 
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‘treatment’ in this context might also have the effect of restricting the scope of conscientious 
objection rights under the Act.166   
While this is inevitably speculative, what seems more likely is that the Government simply felt there 
to be too great a political cost to opening up any aspect of abortion for public debate and scrutiny, in 
a context where it appears to be assumed that providers can ‘work around the deficiencies’ of the 
Act.167  Indeed, the need for ‘caution’ in a politically sensitive area has been cited by a former Health 
Secretary as a reason against permitting home use.168   However, if a judicial review of the 
Government’s refusal to exercise its power to license a ‘broader class of places’ in line with its 
authority to react to further changes in medical science were to be sought, its decision would need to 
be justified by more than vague references to ‘political sensitivity’.169   And it is difficult to construct a 
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167 The CEO of BPAS, reports that ‘[m]inisters and officials at the Department of Health have repeatedly said to 
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coherent defence of the refusal to allow for a British trial designed to inform a decision to license a 
‘broader class of places’ that does not rely on punitive attitudes towards women seeking abortion, 
ignorance of trials that have established the safety and acceptability of home use elsewhere, or some 
combination of the two.170   
Whatever the rationale for the Government’s reluctance to use its power under s.1(3A), the result is 
that service providers and clinicians are left to attempt to work as best they can within the restrictions 
imposed by the existing legal framework, with this provision offering a further example of what 
happens when regulation becomes significantly out of line with the dictates of best clinical practice.  
Again, the broad purpose underpinning this provision (ensuring safety) is not obviously furthered by 
the specific mechanism intended to operationalise it (restrictions on place of provision).  On the 
contrary, as is considered next, the resulting tensions have played out in the adoption of a range of 
treatment protocols that attempt to balance safety, efficacy and convenience for women, with the 
impact of the legal provision clearly cutting against these concerns. 
Early Medical Abortion in Practice: a Range of Regimens 
As noted earlier, in the UK, medical abortion involves the sequential administration of two drugs: 
mifepristone and misoprostol.  Trials have established that the drugs are clinically most effective when 
used 24-72 hours apart, with a slight decline with a 72 hour interval.171  In jurisdictions where no place 
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171 E.G. Raymond, C. Shannon, M.A. Weaver, B. Winikoff ‘First-Trimester Medical Abortion with Mifepristone 
200 mg and Misoprostol: a Systematic Review’  (2013) 87(1) Contraception 26; E.A. Schaff, S.L. Fielding, C. 
of provision restrictions apply, providers are able to explain this to the woman, giving her the drugs to 
take home so that she can time usage to maximise their efficacy and her chances of achieving a 
miscarriage at the time most convenient and acceptable to her (perhaps when her children are absent, 
when her partner or a friend is able to be with her, or avoiding the need to book time off work). If the 
only considerations for how a lawful abortion may be provided are patient safety, clinical effectiveness 
and acceptability to the woman, this is a highly attractive way of delivering an abortion service. 
In the British context, however, home use is blocked by the legal restriction discussed above.  This has 
led service providers to offer a range of options as they negotiate the tension between the best 
interests of their patients and the regulatory framework.  Evidence based medicine is typically used 
to optimise clinical treatment and decision making, establishing the best possible protocol that, other 
things being equal, should then replace others. Here, however, it has been used to introduce a range 
of regimens designed to achieve the optimal balance between efficacy and acceptability to the 
individual woman concerned, within the context of a clinically ungrounded, legal constraint on best 
practice.  
For example, British clinics have offered a same day early medical abortion service, with misoprostol 
administered after the maximum delay compatible with regular opening hours (6-8 hours after the 
mifepristone).  While known to be slightly less effective than the longer delay (achieving a complete 
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abortion in 96% as opposed to 98% of cases),172 this nonetheless remains a very effective treatment 
protocol and, importantly, one that allows a woman to access abortion care as a day service.  A further 
alternative foresees the near simultaneous administration of the two drugs, with misoprostol taken 
15 minutes after the mifepristone.  This is not as effective as when the medicines are given 24 hours 
apart, but still offers a 95% chance of complete abortion, albeit with a marginally greater risk of side 
effects.173 However, these negatives are set against the highly attractive features of this protocol for 
many women, particularly those who will need to travel some distance or to rearrange work or 
childcare commitments to attend a clinic.  It is appears that, even having been informed of the 
decreased chance of success and increased rate of side effects, a sizeable proportion of women prefer 
this regime, accepting the possibility that a further trip to the clinic might be necessary to complete 
the abortion in the event that the initial treatment fails, against the certainty of two visits required for 
a protocol requiring a longer delay in administration.174   
The development of these options shows clinics navigating the tension between statutory 
requirements and the norms of best clinical practice, in a way that allows them to optimise the 
treatment choices available to women.  Above, I noted the importance that the regulatory community 
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173 M.D. Creinin, C.A. Schreiber, P. Bednarek, H. Lintu, M.S. Wagner, L.A. Meyn, Medical Abortion at the Same 
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Apart for Abortion: a Randomized Controlled Trial’ (2007) 109(4) Obstet Gynecol 885. Same time administration 
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174 A service evaluation carried out at BPAS found that, following a detailed explanation of the relative merits of 
the two protocols, 42% (843 of 1,991) women opted for simultaneous administration.  I am grateful to Dr Patricia 
A. Lohr, Medical Director BPAS, for sharing this finding.   
accept the broad ethical values that underpin legislation, citing the concern that, where such 
acceptance is lacking, the law risks becoming treated as mere empty bureaucracy.  Here, the legal 
requirement becomes something rather more pernicious than that: it operates as a clear constraint 
on the ability to offer a service that maximises both clinical effectiveness and acceptability to women.   
Of course, it might be suggested that it is appropriate for non-clinical factors to be at play here.  After 
all, the medical framework envisaged in the Abortion Act aimed simultaneously both to retain control 
over access to abortion services and to ensure that they were provided safely and openly.  Yet unless 
it is believed that rendering access to abortion services more difficult or inconvenient for women is an 
effective and ethically acceptable means of influencing use of them, the ‘place of provision’ 
requirement can play no proper role in meeting the first purpose.  It operates merely to shape the 
way in which lawful services can be offered. By virtue of the narrow interpretation preferred by the 
BPAS court and successive governments’ refusal to license a broader class of places for home use, 
clinicians are prevented from offering best practice to patients undergoing lawfully authorised 
terminations.  The practical impact of the law clearly cuts against the purpose of ensuring that 
abortions ‘should be carried out under the safest conditions attainable’.175 
CONCLUSION 
In order to mitigate the effects of the fact that law ‘speaks from the past’,176 more modern statutes 
regulating morally controversial areas of clinical practice have sometimes established regulatory 
authorities empowered to issue codes of practice.177  This offers a mechanism permitting regulation 
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to evolve in a controlled way, taking account of shifting moral views and scientific knowledge, within 
the broad principles entrenched in the statute.  While such a mechanism is not provided by the 
Abortion Act, it has been seen that this does not mean that the law is static.  Rather, how legal norms 
‘work’ depends on their interpretation, a process that is necessarily dynamic and contingent, adapting 
to suit practical circumstances and local contexts, and informed by evolving knowledge, experience 
and values within the regulatory community. 178  Nonetheless, the need to keep abortion law current 
through interpretative work alone means that a highly anachronistic statutory framework is now 
stretched to breaking point through the need to read it in a way that respects modern clinical practice.   
It has been seen above that a narrow, literal interpretation of the Abortion Act may restrict the 
provision of services in line with current best practice and cut against the purposes that led to its 
introduction; yet, taken to its logical conclusion, a broad, purposive interpretation risks undermining 
the existence of the disputed provisions altogether.  Thus, while a purposive construction of the 
requirement that an abortion must be ‘performed by a registered medical practitioner’ has allowed 
medical practice to evolve in line with considerations of safety and common sense, followed to its 
logical conclusion, the approach would appear to entail that appropriately trained other healthcare 
professionals, operating as part of a multidisciplinary team, should also be permitted to offer any 
procedures that fall within their competence and are not legally reserved to doctors.  Such an 
expansive reading would not offend against the broad purposes of the legislation.  It would, however, 
tend to render the written provision essentially redundant given the general expectation (backed by 
legal and disciplinary sanctions) that any medical procedure offered within formal healthcare services 
should be performed only by those with the requisite skills and training.179   
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179 See generally Sheldon, n 15 above, for discussion of the other kinds of sanctions that would apply here.  
Alternatively, the Abortion Act might be more restrictively interpreted, saving a disputed provision 
from redundancy but only at the expense of allowing it to operate as a clinically unjustified, potentially 
disruptive impediment to the provision of safe, efficient and acceptable services.  Such an effect can 
be seen in the narrow, literal reading of the ‘place of provision’ restriction offered in BPAS.  The 
consequences of this interpretation are seen in the fact that women may risk miscarriage on their 
journey home from the clinic or, alternatively, opt for a less effective treatment protocol with a higher 
rate of side effects in order to work around the legal restriction.  Here, a restrictive reading of the law 
ensures that the provision has some real impact on medical practice but this impact appears entirely 
negative when assessed against the Act’s broad purpose of ensuring safety.   
The need for two doctors to authorise an abortion is at the heart of the medical control envisaged in 
the Abortion Act and dispute regarding appropriate interpretation of this provision has been fierce.  
Notably, concerns have been expressed that the requirement for two doctors’ signatures has become 
treated as a matter of ‘rubber stamping’.   For the Parliament of the late 1960s, the need for two 
doctors’ opinions reflected a widespread belief, endorsed by professional bodies, that the abortion 
decision was properly seen as a medical one.  The requirement for a second opinion was intended as 
an additional safeguard to ensure that the decision was made in good faith, to avoid the possibility 
that rogue doctors might seek to profit from vulnerable women, and to provide protection for the first 
doctor.180  Over the five decades that have passed since the legislation was enacted, however, broad 
support for the idea that it should be doctors who decide whether an abortion is justified has ebbed 
                                                          
 
180 For two recent accounts that highlight the complexity of the political processes leading to the introduction of 
the Abortion Act and, in particular, the role played by professional interests in shaping its terms, see M. 




away, at least in earlier pregnancy when the overwhelming majority of abortions take place.181  It is 
significant here that doctors are now trained to take seriously the right to self-determination of their 
patients, with pregnant women not treated as an exception to that principle in any other context, and 
with this requirement backed by potential disciplinary and legal sanction.  And while the vastly altered 
ethical landscape cannot overrule statutory requirements, it is to be expected that doctors should 
take account of the former in interpreting the latter.  In this context, there seems little to justify the 
restrictive interpretation of the decision-making requirements espoused by the Department of Health.   
Further, accusations that doctors are ‘rubber stamping’ or only ‘creatively complying’ with the law are 
unhelpfully reductive.  The essence of ‘creative compliance’ is ‘compliance with the letter of the law 
while totally undermining the policy behind the words’, so as to escape the intended impact of the 
law.182  In a context where the letter of the law has become so poorly aligned with its own policy 
drivers, however, the accusation simply makes no sense.  Rather, when doctors take a permissive 
approach to their formal decision-making role under the Abortion Act, this is arguably supported by a 
purposive interpretation of the Act, ensuring that ‘socially acceptable abortions are performed 
safely’.183 The result is nonetheless a badly confused legislative framework that offers poor guidance 
to the doctors charged with its interpretation.  In taking a purposive interpretation of the law, what 
does it mean to suggest that doctors should not allow abortion on request but should allow those 
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182 D. McBarnet When Compliance is not the Solution but the Problem: from Changes in Law to Changes in 
Attitude (Centre for Tax System Integrity Working Paper No. 18, 2001).   
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abortions deemed ‘socially acceptable’, when a majority of the British public believe that an abortion 
is morally permissible purely on the basis that it is desired by the pregnant woman?184   
This complex and confused regulatory landscape illustrates both the elasticity of statutory language, 
with considerable regulatory evolution compatible with unchanging statutory text, and the limits to 
such elasticity.  Negotiation of precisely where those limits lie is an important part of law-making and 
one that raises significant and highly complex issues of democracy.185 In this context, an increasingly 
permissive interpretation of the law has supported the development of liberal access to abortion 
services.  Within the first twenty-four weeks of pregnancy, in practical if not formal legal terms, this 
comes close to the ‘abortion on request’ that Parliament was specifically advised would not result 
from the Abortion Act. Yet this interpretation has also allowed the law to keep pace with evolving 
moral views in a context where appropriate opportunities for democratic debate of liberalising reform 
have been deliberately blocked.  While numerous attempts to further restrict the availability of 
abortion over the years have been defeated,186 there has been no opportunity to vote on the 
liberalisation of the law beyond the small number of primarily ‘tidying’ amendments agreed in 1990.  
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A liberalising raft of amendments spearheaded by the Liberal Democrat MP, Evan Harris, was blocked 
by the Brown Government without being put to the vote in 2008.187   
As courts struggle to reconcile the requirements of this antiquated legal framework with the norms of 
contemporary medical practice, it is small wonder that abortion cases feature heavily in casebooks on 
statutory interpretation.188  While once at the forefront of modernising reform, the Abortion Act has 
swung increasingly far adrift from clinical and professional ethical norms of best practice.  Indeed, the 
mechanisms designed to operationalise the Act’s concern with safeguarding women’s health now 
actively cut against that concern.  If the health argument for requiring strict supervision by doctors 
drops away (as is most evidently the case in the context of medical abortion), then an uneasy 
compromise regarding the need for medical control of abortion is disrupted.  We are thus left to 
confront head on the question of whether doctor’s role in the regulatory framework is justified by the 
need for gatekeepers to limit access to safe, legal abortion services to those women who are deemed 
to be deserving, with others left to travel, to access illegal services, or to continue with unwanted 
pregnancies.189     While this paper has not sought directly to engage in the ethical debate regarding 
the morality of abortion, it has noted that as a matter of empirical fact, Britain has moved away from 
accepting such a role for doctors, rather gradually shifting to a position where abortion services are 
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entrenched as an essential part of reproductive healthcare.   In such a context, it is difficult to justify 
the ongoing restrictions imposed by the current law.    
If the same broad purposes that had guided the Abortion Act – permitting socially acceptable 
abortions to take place in conditions of safety – were today allowed to guide the drafting of modern 
legislation, there is little doubt that this would result in a very different regulatory framework.190   
Indeed, given substantial popular support for the view that, at least before viability, abortion decisions 
should be left to the women who must live with their consequences,191 there is a strong argument 
that a new ‘abortion law’ might be no specific law at all.192  Rather, abortion services might simply be 
regulated by the same mass of general criminal, civil, administrative and disciplinary regulations that 
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govern all medical practice.193   Regardless of the detail of any new abortion law, this paper has sought 
to demonstrate that reform is long overdue and that the existing statutory framework is no longer fit 
for purpose. 
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